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Abstract 
A new cohort of Turkish- and Arab-background public intellectuals in Germany locate 
the root of problems of migrant communities in a resemblance between Islamic culture and 
Nazi ideology. Islam critics promote the idea that if, like the children of Nazis before them, 
children of Muslims can rebel against their fathers and sexually liberate themselves, they will 
also be able to embrace the democratic values of German society. In their best-seller books 
Islam critics aim to include migrants in the German national temporal framework and also 
enable a new interpretation of German history not as an anomaly, an evolutionary 
modernization story gone terribly wrong, but as an historical model that other nationalities 
should also pass through and come out of. By studying how highly popular Islam critics 
position Muslims in relation to memory of National Socialism in Germany this article asks 
what kind of transformation (and reproduction) is German Holocaust memory and public 
political culture is undergoing in its perception of its relationship with its Nazi past on the one 
hand and its multi-ethnic present and future on the other. It also asks what role Muslims and 
other minorities play in shaping, reacting to, and corresponding with these transformations. 
By focusing on the unlikely promise of inclusion of the Muslim minority in the German 
national temporality through path dependent repetition, it argues that national memory 
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cultures are formed in relation to and with the help of minorities who are being 
simultaneously incorporated and excluded from the present at once.  
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Holocaust memory, Muslim minority, Islam critic, 
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Introduction 
In the 1990s, when victim-centered Holocaust memory was becoming institutionalized 
in Germany, Turkish-background immigrants likened themselves to Jews in order to attract 
attention to their marginalization within German society (Mandel, 2008). Following the fire 
bombings of Turkish houses in Mölln in 1992 and in Solingen in 1993, Turkish German 
activists organized successful protests with the slogan, “We do not want to be the Jews of 
tomorrow” (Yurdakul and Bodemann, 2006). Similarly, in fiction written by Turkish-
background authors in the 1990s “Turkish figures align themselves with, stand in for, and 
reenact Jewish figures” (Konuk, 2007, 236). In startling contrast, in the 2000s Turkish- 
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Iranian- and Arab-background public intellectuals refrain from likening themselves to Jews. 
Some of them relate to the German memory culture through the memories of violence they 
brought to the country, such as the Armenian Genocide (Konuk 2007, Rothberg and Yıldız 
2010, Von Bieberstein 2017). A more visible and publicly recognized group on the other hand 
establishes timeless similarities and direct connections between Islam/Muslims and National 
Socialism.  
Within this new cohort of self-declared Islam critics one group appeals mostly to the 
right end of the political spectrum. In his international best-seller Islamic Fascism (2014) 
Egyptian born Hamed Abdel-Samed argues that core principles of Islam such as belief in one 
god and ultimate truth are fascistic and that the ideology and program of Muslim 
Brotherhood, the original Islamist movement established in 1920s, had direct ties to Nazis. 
When Abdel-Samed says, “Islamism is the fascism of 21st of century” (Finger 2015), Mina 
Ahadi, the Iranian born chairwoman of ex-Muslims in Germany, takes this argument one step 
further and states that Islam as a whole is comparable to fascism (Crolly 2007). The most 
prominent Turkish background Islam critic, Necla Kelek, recommends that Muslims should 
be treated like fascists, meaning not tolerated in Germany (Klaieber 2018). Such radical 
statements resonate with similar statements being made by other ex-Muslims in other 
countries, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali of the Netherlands or Zineb El Rhazoui of France.  
A second and smaller group within the same cohort that identifies itself with the left, 
and more specifically with the Green Party, although also appeals to the conservative circles 
as well. The most visible representative of this group is Ahmad Mansour, an Israeli Arab 
background recent immigrant to Germany, who likens Muslims to early post-War Germans 
who have the potential of being reeducated and embracing German/European democratic 
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values, if they follow the footsteps of the children of the defeated Germans. Recipient of 
dozens of prestigious awards, a constant presence in mainstream media, and leader of several 
social work projects Mansour applies authoritarian personality theories developed during and 
after WWII to understand and transform fascistic tendencies in the German culture to do the 
same with Muslims today (2014). Turkish and Kurdish background lawyer and activist Seyran 
Ateş similarly argues that the root of the problem among Muslim communities today is the 
one Nazis had: sexual oppression (2011). She suggests if today’s Muslims follow the 
footsteps of the German youth movement of 1968 by rebelling against their fathers and 
sexually liberating themselves, they too will be able to embrace democracy, combat anti-
Semitism and sexism, and be enabled as autonomous individuals. Such Muslim background 
Islam critics themselves walk on the footsteps of post-War German intellectuals such as 
Jurgen Habermas, Martin Walser, Ralf Dahrendorf, Gunther Grass, and Hans Magnus 
Einzsberger who saw their primary responsibility to promote the democratic culture 
established in 1949. Like German “engaged democrats” (Forner, 2014), Islam critics distrust 
and distance themselves from their people and aim to shepherd them towards self-
transformation (Muller, 2000: 8). 
This article attempts to understand why and how come a new cohort of Muslim 
background intellectuals and activists at different ends of political spectrum liken the 
contemporary Muslim minority Germans during the Third Reich or after the defeat in the 
World War II, both before their arrival en masse to Germany? Considering the widespread 
recognition and legitimacy these Islam critics have in Germany, I ask what kind of 
transformation (and reproduction) is German Holocaust memory and public political culture is 
undergoing in its perception of its relationship with its Nazi past on the one hand and its 
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multi-ethnic present and future on the other. Furthermore, what role Muslims and other 
minorities play in shaping, reacting to, and corresponding with these transformations? By 
focusing especially on the ordering of different temporalities to coeval events, in this case 
Germany’s confrontation with its Nazi past and the post-war migration, I argue that national 
memory cultures are formed in relation to and with the help of minorities who are being 
simultaneously incorporated and excluded at once (Partridge, 2008). 
Locating Muslim immigrants in the sediments of German time 
Anthropological and Orientalist discourses have long positioned contemporaneous 
cohabiting groups on an imagined linear timeline that serves to set them apart both spatially 
and temporally. Johannes Fabian argues that, rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition’s 
salvationist ideology, the linear conception of time is on the one hand incorporative: “they 
create a universal frame of reference able to accommodate all societies” (Fabian, 2014: 26). 
On the other hand, linear time’s epistemological basis in historicism serves to distance and 
separate coeval societies: “What makes the savage significant to the evolutionist’s Time is 
that he lives in another Time” (Fabian, 2014: 27). Together these two effects turn historical 
time into “the measure of cultural distance… that was assumed to exist between the West and 
the non-West” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 7). Europeans of colonial or postcolonial background are 
also often framed as lagging behind evolutionary time. According to Fatima El-Tayeb, this is 
why even third-generation Europeans of color are still called migrants: they are permanently 
“not here, not yet” (El-Tayeb, 2016). It is for this reason thinking about Muslim background 
immigrants’ relationship to German democratization and coming to terms with the crimes of 
the Third Reich has been a challenging project, as it involves bringing together anxieties 
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about the past, present, and future together – something Günther Grass called Vergegenkunft, 
a term which mixes the German nouns for the three tenses (Grass, 1980: 127).  
In recent years the Holocaust has come to be considered a monumental event not just by 
Germans and European Jews, but also by Europeans (Assmann, 2014), Americans 
(Flanzbaum, 1999), and others around the world (Huyssen 2003). But in discussions around 
Holocaust memory European Muslims have appeared almost exclusively as challenges. In the 
early 2000s, German and other west European newspapers began to run stories about how 
Muslim students were refusing to attend concentration camp tours and would not engage with 
material in history classes devoted to the discussion of National Socialism (Kouparanis, 2008; 
Ulrich et al., 2010). German popular discourse located Muslims lower down in the 
evolutionary ranking of groups according to their ability to learn the lessons of the Holocaust 
and hence participate in the German democratic post-war culture. The effect of this narrative 
was both to erase the seventy-year long history of Muslim background Germans who have 
contributed to different dimensions of postwar German reconstruction and to depict Germans 
as having reached their destination by dint of having come to terms with the Holocaust 
(Wilds, 2013).    
Another way of looking at postwar Germany in its fuller complexity would be to 
recognize that temporality is not arranged along a straight line where disparate groups march 
one after the other toward confrontation with and acknowledgment of Holocaust and a 
resulting democratization. Postcolonial scholars suggest that there is no one universalizing 
homogenous time, but rather that “a plurality of times exist together” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 
109) where presents, pasts, and futures interlock, “each age bearing, altering, and maintaining 
the previous ones” (Mbembe, 2001: 16).  The German historian and philosopher Reinhardt 
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Koselleck, who came of age in postwar Germany, has a clear analytical model of such 
temporal coexistence and what he calls the “simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous” (die 
Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen) and “sediments of time (Zeitschichten)” (Koselleck, 
2000; Koselleck, 2018: 3). The powerful image he uses in this model is that of layers of 
history imposed one upon the other, where some layers are older, deeper, and solidified and 
some are more volatile: “Historical times consist of multiple layers that refer to each other in 
a reciprocal way, though without being wholly dependent upon each other” (Koselleck, 2018: 
4). Koselleck argues that in the experience of these sediments of time in their multiplicity, 
past, present, and future are always understood in terms of each other; more precisely, both 
the past and the future are experienced in the present, where the present is constantly fleeting 
(Koselleck, 2018: 102–103). Jeffrey Olick suggests such complex relationships between 
multiple levels of historicity can be explained in terms of “path dependency” (1999: 382), 
where “images of the past depend not only on the relationship between past and present but 
also on the accumulation of previous such relationships and their ongoing constitution and 
reconstitution” (1999: 382). How do a new cohort of Muslim background Islam critics relate 
the German past, present, and future, or to its Vergegenkuft in Grass’ terminology, in order to 
include the Muslim minority into the complex matrix of German national temporal frame? 
And at what cost?i 
Past futures, or working through the past 
Over the past two decades, scholarship on Holocaust memory has focused on the 
changing nature of memory culture in Germany. The current victim-centered memory culture 
that is officially promoted conceives the Holocaust as an unquestionable “negative myth of 
origin” and “a primal phantasmatic scene of guilt and shame around which German national 
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identifications are organized” (Moses, 2001: 94). But in fact, this conception became 
mainstream only after Germany unification in 1990. Prior to this, Eastern and Western 
Germans had different approaches to dealing with the Nazi past. In the west, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was keener on coming to terms with the crimes of National Socialism 
(Niven, 2002). In 1978, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) became the first 
German leader to visit a synagogue and ask for reconciliation with Jews, emphasizing, 
however, the innocence of today’s Germans (Wolfgram, 2011: 66). In the east, the former 
German Democratic Republic declared itself the successor to the WWII resistance movement 
and thus refrained from encouraging its citizens down the thorny path of soul-searching (Fox, 
2001). Despite these differences, until the 1980s, East and West Germany promoted similar 
myths that made ordinary Germans seem like innocent victims: both versions of Holocaust 
memory culture held that Germans and Nazis were two separate groups and that the Nazi state 
had terrorized everyone in Germany. As late as 1986, conservative historians from West 
Germany argued that it was time to view Germany’s past as not distinctly evil and to consider 
the crimes of Nazism as akin in severity to those of Bolshevism (Kampe, 1987). As the 
chancellor who oversaw German unification, the conservative Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) was 
interested in focusing on the positive aspects of German history, those prior to World War II. 
After the unification, Jürgen Habermas played a crucial role in the official embrace of a 
victim-centered commemoration where Germans take full responsibility for the Holocaust as 
a proof of their responsible citizenship (Karyn, 2009). Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-
2005) led a new turn in the memory culture that transformed the act of coming to terms with 
the past into a positive attribute of German society. He insisted that Germany could be more 
positive about its past precisely because it had faced it (Welch and Wittlinger, 2011). In a 
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1999 interview, Schröder declared that the new generation’s willingness to face their past is a 
source of empowerment that creates “an opportunity to represent one’s own interests in a 
more uninhibited manner” (Welch and Wittlinger, 2011: 47). Coming just at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, Germany’s ability to confront its dark past came increasingly to be seen 
as the mark of a special kind of moral aptitude which served to legitimize Germany’s 
reappearance on the world stage (Markovits, 2006). 
The crystallization of German Holocaust memory as victim-centered and the 
accompanying sense of “moral superiority” (Frochtner, 2014) for having found the correct 
method of coming to terms with the past coincided historically as well as ideologically with 
the entry of Turkish and Arab immigrants into the national discussion of Holocaust memory. 
The contemporary sense of responsibility hence is directed not only towards the past crimes 
but also simultaneously towards evaluating and educating immigrants (author 2018). While 
Turkish-background Germans in particular have long engaged with the memory of the 
Holocaust, these engagements have by and large been ignored by the general public (Konuk, 
2007). When in the early 2000s German and west European newspapers began to run stories 
about the refusal of Muslim students to attend concentration camp tours and engage with class 
material devoted to the history of National Socialism (Ozyurek, 2018), a twin public discourse 
began to dominate concerning the Muslim importation of anti-Semitism into a country that 
had already come to terms with its own anti-Semitism (Ozyurek, 2016). In response, some 
Muslim-background public intellectuals popular in mainstream society for their critical 
position toward Muslims and Islam promoted the idea that Muslims are exactly at the point 
now where Germans were at 1944. By suggesting that Muslims can also be democratized in 
the future if they follow the footsteps of post-War Germans, they located German Muslims in 
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Germany’s past, but with a developmental path towards a secure future; what Kosseleck calls 
in Germany’s “past future” (Kosseleck 2018: 102). Their model of relating to the German past 
is “path dependent” (Olick 1999: 382), meaning the way they want to include Muslims in the 
German national temporality by replicating not necessarily how German democratization 
happened, but rather how it is remembered.  
An interesting twist in this narrative is the fact that a popular explanation about why 
National Socialism took place is that Germany itself was a late comer to European modernity 
and has to follow the footsteps of West Europeans. As first formulated in the book The 
Belated Nation by Helmut Plessner in 1959, it is argued that Germany missed the opportunity 
to build a strong bourgeoise in the 17th century and hence could not establish a modern liberal 
democracy. Its desperate attempts to catch up with the West led it to take a special path, 
Sonderweg, which then led it to the Third Reich. Since then Anglo-American scholars (Eley 
and Blackbourn 1984) refuted this thesis and showed that Germany did not majorly differ 
from other European countries and there is no one path towards modernization, however the 
theory is still popular. Hence, even in their being belated, Muslims are implicitly likened to 
Germans, and depicted as carrying the hope of democratizing themselves if they walk through 
the footsteps of Germans, who found the right path after learning from their mistakes. When 
Muslims are included in this evolutionary temporality, via taking up the location of late comer 
in relation to Germans, Germans inevitably move up to an advanced stage in the linear path.  
Below I discuss three major and interconnected yet independent aspects of postwar German 
history as they relate to one another layer upon layer, each straining the other’s flow and 
impeding interpretation in the present as a condition of “simultaneity of the unsimultaneous” 
(Kosseleck 2000) and hence forming a “memory genre” to be followed (Olick 1999). 
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Nazis as redeemable naughty boys  
After the defeat of the Germans in 1945, not all Allies shared the opinion that Germans 
could be easily rehabilitated. The Americans were influential in convincing others that 
Germans could be de-Nazified and redemocratized if their culture—especially German family 
relations—could be transformed. The American Department of War worked closely with 
psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists in crafting a narrative that would explain 
Nazism as a psychocultural problem specific to German culture, especially their child-raising 
methods. This approach developed in the US with the help of German émigré scholars mainly 
ignored social and economic explanations behind the rise of National Socialism and reduced it 
to a matter of socio-cultural socialization. Ashis Nandy (2009) has demonstrated how both 
Orientalist and colonial discourses imagine others as children that need to be governed and 
controlled. What was unique in the social science produced around the time of the Allied 
occupation of Germany was the depiction of German difference as that of a gifted child, one 
that can easily be convinced via American-style child raising to change his—here the 
emphasis was specifically on young men—bad behavior and grow himself up into a 
responsible adult (Fay, 2008). A 1943 US government report with the title How to Treat 
Germans advised careful handling: “One of the leading nations within the framework of our 
civilization, Germany, has to be handled as a gifted but dangerous boy who must be watched 
and controlled by strict though well-meaning masters” (quoted in Fay, 2008: 1). American 
occupiers and the social scientists who worked with them saw in Germany the potential for a 
bright future, lead the belated/infantile nation out of its Sonderweg and towards the right path 
of modernization and adulthood.  
Ozyurek, Esra (2019) Muslim minorities as Germany’s past future: Islam critics, holocaust memory, and 
immigrant integration. Memory Studies. ISSN 1750-6980 (In Press) 
 
12 
 
Hence, in teaching democracy to Germans, Western occupiers approached them as 
children and in turn Germans themselves approached Nazis as naughty boys. In other words, 
Nazi criminality came to be seen as a case of juvenile delinquency. In his psychological 
bestseller, Childhood and Society, the American German Jewish émigré Eric Erikson (1963) 
discusses German identity through “the legend” of Hitler’s childhood. According to him, 
Hitler was “an adolescent who never gave in,” “a glorified older brother, who took over the 
prerogatives of the fathers without overidentifying with them” (Erikson, 1963: 337). 
According to Erikson, because Hitler and Nazism had hypnotized Germans with black-and-
white thinking, the youth were unable to go through the healthy stages of puberty. Instead 
they became stuck in a protracted stage of adolescence and endless rebellion. Hitler’s 
adolescent rebellion was popular among Germans, he argued, because pre-Nazi German 
manhood had been wedged between harsh and authoritarian treatment toward the wife and 
children at home and submissive acquiescence to other men at work. It is telling that the most 
important findings published by those American social scientists who worked closely with the 
occupying American appeared in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. Mosby’s Medical 
Dictionary (Harris, Nagy, and Vardaxis, 2014) defines this subdiscipline as “the branch of 
psychiatry that specializes in correcting incipient and borderline mental and behavioral 
disorders, especially in children, and in developing preventive techniques to promote mental 
health and emotional growth and development.” 
In evaluation of the problematic aspects of the German family, fathers were seen as the 
main suspects who led their sons to turn towards authoritarianism. This model was especially 
potent for re-democratization because it put the guilt on the older generation and depicted 
younger Germans as innocent and changeable. Accounts by German historians suggests that a 
Ozyurek, Esra (2019) Muslim minorities as Germany’s past future: Islam critics, holocaust memory, and 
immigrant integration. Memory Studies. ISSN 1750-6980 (In Press) 
 
13 
 
psycho-culture-centered understanding of democracy was embraced by many Germans, 
especially the Christian circles, as early as the late 1940s. By the 1950s, notions such as 
“democratic family” and “democratic fatherhood” as a way out of Nazi mind set enjoyed wide 
circulation (Van Rahden, 2011). It was suggested at the time that “only children who were 
raised to be mature members within [a democratic family] could later be expected to 
participate responsibly in social and political life” (Van Rahden, 2011: 68). As from 1955, 
and the end of Germany’s occupation, a strong focus on fatherhood remained even as 
fatherhood’s content changed. Numerous publications and films encouraged fathers in their 
paternal and civic responsibilities, seen as necessary “for the future of the West German 
family and the nation” (Van Rahden, 2011: 120). 
Democratization through youth rebellion 
With the student movement of 1968, a second German attempt to come to terms with its 
Nazi past was launched. This time, the focus was on Germans shedding Nazi culture not as 
children who should be properly raised by good fathers, but as youth (students) who must 
rebel against their Nazi fathers. 1968 in Germany has been characterized as an “anachronistic 
rebellion” and “a desperate attempt to correct history retroactively” (Schmidt, 2010: 270). The 
German student rebellion against authority specifically aimed at destroying retrospectively the 
culture and ideology that had led to the Holocaust. In Hans Kundnani’s words a good portion 
of the ’68 generation “spen[t] their entire lives attempting to escape their fathers’ influence 
and to become the opposite of their fathers—and perhaps in doing so to atone for their 
father’s sins.” (Kundnani, 2009: 11) Herbert Marcuse, a German Jewish émigré to the US 
considered “the father of the new left,” specifically instructed German youth to rebel against 
their fathers and to not take on their guilt (Marcuse, 1971: 9). A number of ’68ers 
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subsequently published novels and memoirs about their struggles with their fathers, a genre 
called Vaterliteratur (Schneider and Daniel, 1984). 
If one major theme of the ’68 movement was to dissociate with their fathers (Kundnani 
2009, Schmidt 2010), a second was the need to rebel against Nazi ideology by taking a 
standing against sexual oppression and strict paternal authority, which ’68ers saw as defining 
features of Nazism. This branch, inspired by the radical Jewish Austrian psychoanalyst 
Wilhelm Reich who had died a decade before the ’68 movement and led by the activist Dieter 
Kunzelmann, believed that to transform German society and break from of the leftovers of 
fascism, bourgeois sexual conventions and family arrangements needed to be demolished 
(Kundnani, 2009: 52). Originally published in 1933, Reich argued in The Mass Psychology of 
Fascism (1970) that the masses had turned to authoritarianism as a result of sexual 
oppression. “The moral inhibition of the child’s natural sexuality […] makes the child afraid, 
shy, fearful of authority, obedient, ‘good,’ and ‘docile’ in the authoritarian sense of the words. 
It has a crippling effect on man’s rebellious forces.… Thus, the family is the authoritarian 
state in miniature…” (Reich, 1970: 30). Kunzelmann’s Kommune 1 and other communes that 
followed held daily collective psychoanalysis sessions, rejected monogamy, experimented 
with drugs and sexuality in order to break with moral inhibitions and their authoritarian 
tendencies. They believed that if young people can liberate themselves sexually, they might 
then be able to resist the remnants of fascism in Germany and resolve social and political 
injustices (Herzog 1998). 
Dagmar Herzog (1998), German American historian of sexuality, argues that the 
sexually conservative attitudes that ’68ers fought against so adamantly as the root of Nazi 
ideology was in fact not part of Nazi culture but rather a product of Christian ideology that 
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came to dominate postwar German society in the 1950s. Members of the student movement 
experienced multiple sediments of history simultaneously, imposing one atop another. They 
aimed to transform their present experience with a past they remembered anachronistically in 
the first place, imagining their parents as sexually oppressed and authoritatively controlled by 
their parents. Both the first and second waves of German democratization where characterized 
by a strong desire to undo the past coupled with a utopian belief in the potential of youth. 
Competing visions of Muslim minority integration 
As a generation of German youth were challenging traditional understandings of family, 
sexuality, and child raising, millions of so-called guest workers from rural backgrounds in 
Italy, Spain, and Turkey were arriving. Often seen as unconnected to German attempts to 
come to terms with the Holocaust, the history of immigration in Germany is in fact deeply 
connected to it. Despite being commonly imagined as a merely postwar phenomenon, Turks 
and Turkish Jews were already present in Germany during the Third Reich and were part of 
Holocaust history as collaborators, by-standers, and victims (Baer, 2013). In the following 
decades a number of immigrant-background artists (Konuk, 2007), activists (Yurdakul and 
Bodemann, 2006), and lay citizens (Rothberg and Yıldız, 2011; Partridge, 2010) have taken 
part in the complex path of coming to terms with the German past, however these 
engagements have remained at the margins of German national narratives and consciousness. 
Muslim-background public intellectuals started to play a significant role in mainstream 
German memory culture only in the 2000s through their likening of Islam/Muslims to Nazi 
ideology or to the pre-war German culture that led to Nazism especially in their approach to 
faulty child-raising methods and sexual oppression. Islam critics built on the theories of 
authoritarian national character studies, originally developed to explain Nazism, to argue that 
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authoritarian fathering practices lead to violent, paranoid, and anti-Semitic adolescents fit 
only for authoritarian ideologies. They describe in detail a timeless Muslim family and overtly 
or covertly liken it to the Nazi family that the American occupiers and later the 1968 
movement set out to demolish.ii 
In his bestseller book Generation Allah, Ahmad Mansour (2014) combines his personal 
experiences growing up in a Palestinian village in Israel and his encounters with Muslims as a 
social worker in Germany over the past ten years with pseudoscientific statements about how 
a homogenized Muslim psycho-culture works across time and place. The Muslim family he 
depicts is a cruel one that aims to break the will of their children, wields verbal and emotional 
violence, and gives no space for independence. Mansour itemizes the damage children suffer 
within this collectively psychiatrized Muslim family and warns his readers how such bad 
child-raising practices can lead to dangerous results for Muslims and for German society 
alike. Because, according to him, this is a general psychocultural problem for all Muslims and 
the threat Germany faces comes not from a few hundred fanatic Islamists, but from the entire 
generation of young Muslims—Generation Allah—who are all under threat of Islamic 
radicalization (Mansour, 2014: 32). By calling Muslims Generation Allah and focusing 
mainly on youth, Mansour depicts all Muslims as troubled youth, who need to be ruled and 
governed but who can also be seen as innocent and hence transformed through the right 
methods. The dynamics of the Muslim family he depicts, and the end results he warns against 
are strikingly similar to authoritarian family models developed by post-War American and 
émigré scholars such as Eric Erikson and then intellectuals of the 1968 movement that explain 
and cure the German authoritarian family structure. 
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Both Mansour’s book and the social project he popularized in Germany for sexual 
equality and against the pressure of honor Heroes (Bundesamt, 2007) feature the concept of 
“honor culture,” used interchangeably with Islam. According to Mansour, sexual control of 
women prevents Muslims from adopting the democratic culture of Germany. He builds a 
model of a catastrophic Muslim child development that oppresses not only sexual drives but 
also the development of a healthy and mature personality. According to Mansour, sexual 
oppression is the root of honor culture and the source of radicalization among Muslim youth: 
My observations suggest that the suppression of sexuality is one of the 
key factors of people’s radicalization. (…) In a shame culture, where modesty 
is a positive value, genders are segregated, and sex is taboo, neither men or 
women can develop their individuality. This produces suffering, anger, 
anxiety, a feeling of being torn, depression, and violence. Especially for young 
men, it creates a considerable and often dangerous potential for violence. 
(Mansour, 2014: 129). 
According to Mansour, and post-war scholars of national character studies, in 
patriarchal families with authoritarian fathers, boys develop a strict, zealous, and intolerant 
superego, have a black and white perception of right and wrong, respect submission to 
authority, have a negative view of people, and are preoccupied with violence and sex (Adorno 
et all, ,1950; Mansour, 2014)  Strictly patriarchal families prevent children from experiencing 
healthy adolescence which they should be able to grow out of. Since they cannot grow out of 
it, they can never become mature adults fit for democracy. According to Mansour this 
dynamic becomes especially worse for Muslims because they have an equally strict 
patriarchal image of God, which makes the authority of the father even stronger (Mansour 
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2014: 106). As Muslims get stuck in adolescence, they turn towards Islamic radicalization 
which places them in rigid authority relations with clear rules.  
Mansour also posits an alternative Muslim father model experienced especially in 
Western Europe: the dysfunctional father. According to him this is equally if not more 
dangerous for the development of children. 
Here, we have a disempowered father who is to some extent a phantom. 
Whether it is because he has lost his job, his self-esteem, his ability to be a role 
model, or because he shows weakness for other reasons. Let’s look at a father 
who speaks broken German, while his son and daughter speak the language 
fluently. The more the father tries to regain his authority, the more he loses it. 
Often such children look for other authority figures, role models, and idols 
which can act as a substitute for the idealized father fantasy. (Mansour, 
2014:106–17). 
This dysfunctional dynamic is again, according to Mansour, especially problematic for 
Muslim children because for them the search for a replacement father figure leads them to 
Allah and his representatives. “Whoever has experienced an unhealthy relationship with their 
father is receptive to a version of Allah that is punishing, revengeful, and angry.” Children 
who grow up in such families, he contends, will inevitably find Salafism, a puritanical 
approach to Islam which Mansour professes expertise on. “The Salafistic God-phantom 
correlates with a longing resulting from dysfunctional and often traumatic experience in early 
childhood. Its promise of paradise and rigidity is enormously complementary to the damaged 
psyche” (Mansour, 2014: 108). In other words, Mansour argues if the Muslim father is 
authoritarian his children will become radicals because they are comfortable only in 
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frameworks of authority and if he is an absent father his sons will again be radicals by looking 
for authoritarian substitutes. Like pre-war German fathers simultaneous “aloofness and 
harshness” at the same time (Erikson 1963: 332) led to the development of their children 
turning Nazism, Mansour argues the Muslim fathers’ simultaneous strictness and absence lead 
their sons towards Islamic radicalization. In his model, Muslim children live completely cut 
off from mainstream German society and whatever bad happens to them is exclusively the 
result of the wrong Islamic family values. 
Among the youth programs Mansour runs or advises is an Islamic deradicalization 
program called Hayat (Life in Arabic and Turkey) funded by the German Federal Office for 
Immigration and Refugee Affairs. iii Hayat is housed at Society for Democratic Culture which 
is known for the award-winning neo-Nazi radicalization program founded by an ex-police 
detective and an ex-neo-Nazi leader in 2000. In 2011 the organization decided to transfer its 
know-how on working with neo-Nazis to working on radicalized Muslims. On their web page 
the project is defined in following words: “Hayat is the first German counseling program for 
persons involved in radical Salafist groups or on the path of a violent Jihadist radicalization, 
including those travelling to Syria and other combat zones.” iv Even though the brochures 
produced by Hayat recognizes that only very few of Salafis are violent, in line with 
Mansour’s model it approaches all Salafis as threats to democracy: “the ‘moderate” 
representatives of Salafism in Germany stand for positions and perspectives, which can be 
regarded as a threat to democracy – for example, when they defame and demarcate different 
thinking and living. Against this background, Salafi ideologies are not only a topic of security 
policy, but also a field for pedagogy and political education.” (ibid).  Hayat equalizes neo-
Nazi radicalism with Salafism and uses the same approach to deal with both groups. One of 
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the few entries in their web page is a manual on how to raise children – specifically pre-
scholars – democratically. The document recommended that that families include everyone in 
the decision-making process, family members make arguments to convince others, and in the 
end, members vote by raising hands. The idea is very similar to one developed in the 1950s is 
that children who are raised with democratic methods will not turn towards radicalism.  
 
Necla Kelek, a Turkish-background sociologist and the most vocal Islam critic in 
Germany, is in complete agreement with Mansour that the lack of good father models is at the 
root of the problem with male Muslim adolescents in Germany and elsewhere. In a debate she 
participated where she argued against building new mosques in Germany, Kelek emphasized 
how mosques are harmful for society because Muslim fathers spend too much time there. 
Mosques, she argues make Muslim fathers both too strict and absent at the same time. 
Neither the high number of young men who leave school without 
graduating—60 percent of them come from Muslim families—or the Turkish 
boys who hang round on the streets are a coincidence. They have no fathers as 
role models—because they are sitting at the mosques. And the more fathers sit 
at the mosques, the more rigid they become. They obey God, come home and 
force others to obey them. The fathers are not friends to their sons, they do not 
take care of them and they have no loving relationship with their wives. (Kelek 
et al., 2007). 
In her 2006 book, The Lost Sons: A Plea for the Liberation of Turkish Men, in which 
she interviews Muslim men in German prisons, Kelek emphasizes her own struggle with her 
father. Without telling us the content of their conflict, she claims that when she was seventeen 
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years old she had an argument with her father and that he chased her around the house with an 
ax. By her account, once her father understood that he no longer had authority over the 
family, he left the house, upon which she and her brothers celebrated his departure. Kelek 
attributes her success in life as an independent person to having been able to rebel against her 
father and having won the fight. In this way, she presents herself as a model rebel other 
Muslims should imitate if they want to be independent and successful individuals. 
Seyran Ateş, a Turkish- and Kurdish-background lawyer and feminist activist who recently 
became a liberal imam, also argues in her book Islam Needs a Sexual Revolution (2011) that this 
Islamic emphasis on obedience to parents is what keeps Muslims from becoming mature adults and 
citizens suitable for a democratic regime.v “The rebellion against authority, whether it be the state or 
family members, especially father and mother, has no political character in the Islamic world. Thus, 
submission and obedience remain with a great many Muslims for a lifetime” (Ateş, 2011: 92). 
According to Ateş, the sexual revolution helped people in the world, above all Germans, to get rid of 
their sexual oppression which was the cause of national socialism in the first place. According to her, 
having learned from Wilhelm Reich, the 68-movement fought against sexual oppression. Because 
they knew that: “An inhabited sexuality leads to aggression and frustration and encourages empathy 
for dictatorial systems” (Ateş, 2011: 87). For her, today, the Muslim world is just like the pre-
sexually liberated and pre-de-nazified Germany: “When I look at the Muslim world, I see exactly the 
Western youth of the 1960s. I myself grew up with the ideas of honoring older people, paying them 
respect (even if they make mistakes) and obeying them, because they did everything better and made 
all the decisions. In the Muslim world children understand nothing and have no rights. Whoever does 
not follow rules and orders, who is open-minded or stands up, get a hitting. My childhood is only 
some time back, but the majority of Muslim children who are growing up today are still being raised 
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the same way.” (Ateş, 2011: 92). As a European Muslim, Ateş believes it her duty to encourage 
rebellion first among European Muslims and then among the Muslim population at large so that they 
can be democratized. 
While these writings share in the common European trope that views both colonial 
subjects and minorities as troubled children who need to be monitored and disciplined 
(Nandy, 2009) and in colonial distinctions between colonizers and the colonized secured 
through sexual control and middle-class notions of respectability (Stoler, 1989), they are 
nevertheless distinct. The way in which the Muslim problem is turned into the figure of the 
unruly male adolescent whose sexuality and violence is out of control is unique in its 
connections to discourses about the Nazis conceptualized by postwar Americans and 
Germans. This trend of likening Muslims to Nazis shares parallels with the discourse that 
likens pre-WWII German culture to culture in the German Democratic Republic (Borneman, 
1993; Glaeser, 2000). Anthropologist Nitzan Shoshan (2017) has argued that “the contrast 
with East Germany allowed the West to corroborate and reaffirm its liberal democratic 
credentials and hence to fortify its claim to a radical difference with the Third Reich. After 
1989, however, the East has continued to serve the same purpose, casting Germany’s liberal 
democratic society as mature enough to crusade for what it once had to be taught” (Shoshan, 
2017: 41). Muslim background Islam critics attempt to liken the Muslim problem to that of 
the East German problem and by doing so they appeal to liberal and also right-wing groups by 
indicating that Muslims are capable for following first West and then East Germans and 
finally achieve democratization. 
Muslims to engage Germany’s past, Germans to get over it 
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Collapsing the Nazi past with that of the Muslim present allows Islam critics like 
Mansour and Ateş to depict Muslims as redeemable and worthy of expensive social 
rehabilitation projects. Given the correct methods—which Mansour and Ateş claim to have 
mastered—Muslims can be Germany’s past future and march through the same stages toward 
democratization that Germans have. In his writings, Mansour suggests that if Nazis could be 
rehabilitated, then so can Muslims. After a long passage on problematic Muslim child-raising 
techniques, Mansour writes, “The revolts of 1968 prove that this dynamic may be lifted. … 
The ’68 generation broke their identification with their fathers and condemned their acts. … 
What patriarchal societies need more than anything else is just such a rebellion against the 
authority of their fathers and normal family violence” (Mansour, 2014: 105).  
Yet with such a project comes the price of shifting the responsibility of coming to terms 
with the Holocaust onto the shoulders of the Muslim minority, and by doing so lightening the 
burden on German shoulders. It is noteworthy that Islam critics took on the position of 
likening Muslim culture with that of the German culture during Nazism after the building of 
the massive Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in 2004, which number of sceptics 
saw as reflective of a desire to have “a place where Germans would come dutifully to 
unshoulder their memorial burden, so that they could move freely and unencumbered into the 
twenty first century” (Young 2002: 70).  Poignantly, the very same Islam critics who 
encourage Muslims to follow in the footsteps of Germans who rebelled against their parents, 
their authoritarian culture, and Nazi crimes also encourage native-background Germans to 
stop taking the heritage of the Holocaust too seriously and move forward. Germans should in 
short get over the Holocaust. Islam critics warn the majority population that their guilt in 
relation to the Holocaust makes them “falsely” tolerant of Muslims, who actually are the real 
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Nazi look-alikes.vi In her autobiography, Ateş (2003) argues that because the German 
government has since the end of WWII been unnecessarily too careful not to appear racist, a 
problematic atmosphere developed wherein September 11 attackers could flourish in 
Germany. “This false dream of tolerance and Germany’s fear of being called racist are 
helping fundamentalists” (quoted in Ewing, 2008: 162). In The Foreign Bride, Kelek (2005) 
makes a similar argument: 
“There is a panicked fear of discriminating against Islamists because of 
their religion or background; one prefers to condone their infringement of 
fundamental rights instead. This, however, stems from the specific identity 
problem of Germans.... Germans have deeply engaged with their Nazi past and 
the crimes against others. This surely has contributed to the civil and 
democratic character of this republic. But at times the special feelings of guilt 
toward Jews, Sinti, Roma, homosexuals and others block the clear view on 
today’s realities of oppression and exclusion” (quoted in Yıldız, 2011: 89). 
Yasemin Yıldız (2011) argues that Islam critics such as Necla Kelek point to a move 
away from left-liberal European stances on victim-centered Holocaust memory culture such 
as that represented by Jürgen Habermas. I suggest that Islam critics in fact take yet another 
and more consequential step—they insist that Muslims should not be likened to Jewish 
victims under the guise of fake tolerance but should instead be likened to Nazi perpetrators. 
Simultaneously they promote a shift in focus from Muslim women as victims of oppression to 
Muslim men as oppression’s perpetrators. Not Kelek or Abdel-Samed, but Ateş and Mansour 
see in that likening a chance to include Muslims in the German national timespace. In 
Muslims these Islam critics see the same potential that American occupiers saw in German 
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youth in the late 1940s, that German students saw in themselves in 1968. Furthermore, by 
making pointing out fascistic tendencies in their own communities and shepherding them 
towards democracy, they themselves model on walking on the footsteps of post-War German 
intellectuals. The other corollary of such an historical equation between Muslims and post-
War Germans is to argue that Germans have already reached their destination and became the 
mature adults the American occupiers of WWII hoped for. Having proved themselves, Islam 
critics suggest, Germans can now stand in the shoes of the occupying American forces and 
can focus on rehabilitating Muslims by being good role models for them. 
Conclusion 
In 1979, Reinhardt Koselleck wrote the following prescient words: 
“The events of 1933 [when the Nazis came to power] have occurred once 
and for all, but the experiences which are based upon them can change over 
time. Experiences overlap and mutually impregnate one another. In addition, 
new hopes or disappointments, or new expectations enter them with 
retrospective effect. Thus, experiences alter themselves as well, despite, once 
having occurred, remaining the same. This is the temporal structure of 
experience and without retrospective expectation it cannot be accumulated” 
(Koselleck, 2004: 262). 
Muslim-background Islam critics establish a linear German national temporality and 
suggest that Muslims can also enter it from point zero, the same place where defeated 
Germans started in 1945. After depicting a timeless Muslim family that suffers from the most 
troubling aspects of the purported German family that led to Nazism, critics reason that if 
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Muslims are treated rightly as children who have been incorrectly parented and as adolescents 
who have been unable to free themselves from social and sexual authority, they can also be 
democratized. In so doing, Islam critics contend that the German experience of having learned 
from the mistakes of 1933 can be repeated and will be liberating. Islam critics themselves 
replicate many of the opinions produced by post-War German intellectuals about German 
society and promote the idea that together with Germany they can lead the Muslim 
communities out of authoritarianism and towards democratization.  
In making this historiographic claim, their goal is clear: at the expense of equating 
racialized Muslim minorities with defeated Germans, they seek to include Muslim minorities 
into the German fold by placing them on the timeline of German national temporality—even 
if they place them at the start, behind the present at point zero. With this rhetorical move, 
Muslim public intellectuals send the message that the majority German populace has reached 
its destination in their journey towards democratization and should no longer feel guilty for 
the sins of their Nazi fathers, most especially in relation to Muslim minority groups. This 
historical rubric about learning from the Holocaust, envisioned as a linear evolutionary 
historicity with Muslims at the starting point and Germans having reached the destination, is 
crucial to the way center-right Germans relate to the past, the present, and the future in 
Germany today. 
The suggestion that Muslims in Germany and elsewhere should repeat what postwar 
Germans did in order to liberate themselves from their authoritarian culture creates a puzzling 
reordering of unconnected temporalities. One important aspect of equating contemporary 
Muslims with defeated fascists of a generation or two ago is to go against a more essentialist 
and racializing view that Muslims are completely different people who live in their own 
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national time and hence can never connect with Germans. Rather, Islam critics more to the 
left end of the spectrum suggest, Muslims are just a few decades behind Germans and can 
catch up when approached with the right policies. In other words, this discourse assigns 
contemporary Muslims to Germany’s “past future” (Koselleck 2018: 102), a future that was 
once aspired for defeated Nazis by their Allied victors and later by the Germans themselves. 
This emphasis on hope for a better future makes itself clear in the way that the American 
occupiers of 1945 often viewed Germans as naughty boys, mainstream German society saw 
’68ers as rebellious youth, and Muslim background critics of Islam regard Muslim minorities 
as adolescents. Islam critics under study here declare Germans to have realized their potential 
and as mature adults who live in “future present” (Koselleck, 2018: 102), a way of being that 
will last into the future. In so doing however, however, they erase Muslim minorities from the 
“present present” (Koselleck, 2018: 102) that they have been cohabiting together with the 
German majority.  
The idea that the process of German democratization is a formula that different 
nationalities can repeat, including Muslim minorities, is enabled by a historicity prevalent 
since the end of WWII whereby different sediments of time flow simultaneously and in 
tension with each other. In postwar Germany, a conservative trajectory that prioritized family 
values, a left-liberal trajectory that promoted sexual freedom, a process of coming to terms 
with the crimes of the Third Reich, and an immigration history that made Germany plural but 
also resurfaced racializing tendencies all flow as historical sediments in relation to one 
another, alongside many other social processes: an aging population, economic success, 
refugee crisis that brought the deep challenges of European Union to surface, and ever 
shifting global political alliances. The defeat of the Third Reich and the potential its occupiers 
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saw in Germans despite the horrors they caused, and how democratization is remembered 
today serves as the trigger generating trajectories into the future which all flow coevally but at 
their own speed. 
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Endnotes  
ii In a brief discussion of her fieldnotes Sultan Doughan (2013) also suggests that 
Kosseleck is helpful to understand the tensions around Muslim participation in the German 
Holocaust memory culture.  
 
ii A newer, but not yet popular discourse in Germany accuses Muslim women and specifically 
mothers for being the ones responsible for sexism and violence in Muslim communities 
(Ramadani, 2017). This discourse is already popular in France (Mack, 2017). 
iii For the website see https://hayat-deutschland.de/english/ (accessed 27 March 2019) 
iv For the website see https://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/  (accessed 27 March 2019) 
v Ateş had originally wanted to call the book I Fuck Whomever I Want, the alleged last words 
of Hatun Sürücü killed in Berlin at a bus stop by her brother in 2005 after divorcing her 
husband who was her cousin. 
vi Feminist Alice Schwarzer (2002) began the conversation on “false tolerance” towards 
Muslims, likening them to fascists. Katrin Sieg (2010) argues that “the juxtaposition of an 
enlightened democratic European culture against an Islamo-fascist other outside and within its 
borders rests on reifying sexual liberty as an essential European trait and thus seeks to 
reconnect demos to ethnos in a regressive, exclusionary gesture” (182). 
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